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CALCULATION OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
FRANCHISE AND ANTITRUST RELIEF
Harold Brown*
Legal fees are a direct coefficIent of protectIOn for the legal
nghts of consumers and busmesspersons. These persons are often
unwilling to exerCIse theIr legal nghts because of the prohibitIvely
hIgh expense necessarily assocIated with legal representatIOn. 1 At
common law the system of contmgent fees 2 was adopted to con
front the problems that accompamed the skyrocketmg cost of legal
fees, despite the complicated ethICal problems that accompany that
compensatIon system. 3
The legal community has developed an array of legal aIds de
sIgned to assIst persons of moderate l"eans. Group legal servIces,
prepaId legal fee msurance, legal referral servIces, and legal climcs
are desIgned to reduce the cost of litIgatIon. In additIon, class ac
tIons 4 provIde an efficIent and economICal method of litIgatIon.
CongressIOnal concern over the economIC realitIes of legal expenses
has been manifested m a plethora of statutes5 desIgned to award lePartner m the law firm of Brown, Prifti, Leighton and Cohen, Boston, Mass.
B.A., Yale Umversity, 1936; LL.B., 1939, LL.M., 1940, Harvard Law School.
1. For discussIOn of the economic Impact of legal costs on the mlddleclass see
B.F CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS (1970) (Amencan
Bar Foundation).
2. See MASS. SUP JUD. CT. R. 3:14.
3. See Brown, Some Observations on Legal Fees, 24 Sw U.L. REV 565 (1970).
4. See FED. R. CIV P 23. The class action prOVides method whereby persons
of moderate or modest means could combme their efforts m obtammg meanIngful ac
cess to the courts. HawaII
Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972) (Marshall, J.)
Thus, the class action serves the dual purpose of proViding an accessible means of
litigation to the plamtiff and mcreased JudiCial adminIstrative effiCiency
Attorneys, however, have had to petition the courts for an allowance of legal fees
paid out of the funds created through their efforts. Lmdy Bros. Builders, Inc.
Amencan Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lmdy I),
and Lmdy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Amencan Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540
F.2d 102, 118 n.12 (3d Cir. 1976) (Lmdy II).
5. There are more than 75 federal statutes whICh authonze the award of attor
ney fees. See Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys Fees: What IS "Reasonable"~
126 U PA. L. REV 281, 303 (1977) (a comprehenSive review of the attorney fee
Issue with
focus beyond the franchise Issue); Cohen, Award of Attorney Fees
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gal fees agamst a vIOlatIon. 6 The awarding of these legal fees, how
ever has Imposed a new burden on the JudicIary PrevIOusly
courts were seldom mvolved m the legal fee problems of clients
and attorneys.7 A Judge regularly assesses and appropnates legal
compensatIOn today ThIs paper will focus on the standards and
procedures whICh should be utilized to compute appropnate attor
neys fee awards m complex litIgatIon such as franchIse and antI
trust cases. 8
Attorneys fees have a specIal Importance m franchIsmg. A
decade ago, a leading franchIsor publicly boasted that franchIsees
were helpless smce they could not afford the legal fees necessary to
obtam redress. However factual that statement mIght have been, it
IS Just as probable that the franchIsees were not aware of theIr
nghts and were unprepared to engage m complex and costly litIga
tion. ThIs Imposed a senous burden on the attorney asked to re
dress the egregIOus conduct. He had to assess hIS own mtenm
liqUIdity prospectIvely durmg the years of potentIal court actIon.
For the undercapitalized practitIoner, the financIal burdens and
nsks mIght be so msurmountable that representatIOn of the
undercapitalized franchIsees would be declined. Consequently
prosecutIon was neglected or premature settlement was accepted.
EconomICs, m essence, dictated the merits of some cases. 9
LegIslatIve recognitIon of economIC realitIes led to exemplary
damages and the awarding of attorneys fees and costs agamst VIOla
tors of antitrust laws 10 and "little Federal Trade CommISSIOn
Against the United States: The Soveretgn Is Still Somewhat Immune, 2 W NEW
ENG. L. REV 177 (1979).
6. State legislatures have also enacted statutes which address the attorneys
fees Issue. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93A, §§ 9(4) & 11 (West Cum. Supp.
1979) (consumer protection law with mandatory double and permissive treble dam
ages, plus an assessment for legal fees and costs).
7 See In re Osofsky 50 F.2d 925, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (ongIn of extensive
standards for court determination of attorneys fees). See generally A. MILLER, AT
TORNEYS' FEES IN CLASS ACTIONS: A STUDY PREPARED FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER (1979); 3 H. NEWBURG, CLASS ACTIONS § 6924d, at 1149-50 (1976).
8. The specific example used to illustrate the awarding of attorneys fees will
be based on hypothetical franchise case. It IS Important to remember that In an an
titrust suit, prevailing plaintiff IS awarded treble damages and reasonable attorneys
fees. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) (Clayton Antitrust Act).
9. The analysIs of an attorney economIC solvency IS not limited to small and
medium size law firms. Major law firms have also recogmzed the severe finanCial
burden of contingent fee litigation In complex cases. Many firms require pnor case
approval by an executive screemng committee before the firm will represent the cli
ent. Such committees conSider the merits of the claim, collectability of an award, rea
sonable assurance of partial retainer and possibility of on-gOing cost reimbursement.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976).
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(FTC) Acts. l l In 1976, Congress amended the antitrust statute m
order to provIde for attorneys fees when only mJunctIve relief was
obtamed. 12
While the courts have conSIstently awarded fees, they have
yet to achIeve monetary uniformity 13 ThIS fact IS of partIcular Im
portance m antitrust and franchIsmg cases because of the poten
tIally large economIC verdicts. 14 ThIs article IS desIgned to prOVIde
gUIdance to the courts m the assessment of attorneys fees. It will
use for its example the awarding of fees m a hypothetical franchIse
case.
Assume that a settlement has been achieved m a complex suit
11. It IS typIcal for state legIslatures to parallel federal legIslation m vanous
areas. The state acts are often referred to as little federal acts, therefore the reference
to Little Federal Trade CommISSIOn Acts. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93A,
§§ 9-11 (West Cum. Supp. 1979).
12. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C. § 26;
Blum
DistrIct of Columbia Nurses Ass n, [1979] 2 TRADE CAS. (CCH). ~ 62,984, at
79,597 (D.D.C. 1979). In Knutson v. Daily RevIew, Inc., the Court reduced the lode
star attorney fee award by 25% because there had only been recovery of nommal
damages m the distnct court. Knutson v. Daily RevIew, Inc., 936 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REp (BNA) A-25-26 (citing Knutson
Daily RevIew, Inc., 468 F Supp.
226,236 (N.D. Cal. 1979)). The court first allowed an additional 15% for the delay m
receIpt of payment. 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP (BNA) at A-26 (citing Lmdy
Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Amencan Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102
(3d Cir. 1976) (Lmdy II)). The statute applies to all pending cases. Alphm
Henson, 552 F.2d 1033 (4th Cir.),cert. denIed, 434 U.S. 823 (1977).
13. "[T]he only truly consIstent thread that runs throughout federal court deCI
sIOns on attorneys fees IS theIr almost complete mconslstency Berger, supra note
5, at 292. ThIS same contention IS applicable to state courts as well.
14. The awarding of attorneys fees has most often been associated with CIvil
nghts litigation. While many of the same computations are used m both CIvil rights
litigation and antitrust litigation, there are potential distinctions m the sIze of the
award and the economIc mtrlcaCles of the litigation. See note 26 mfra and accompa
nymg text.
One of the more controversial rulings on awards m the CIvil nghts sector IS now
under en banc reconsIderation by the Court of Appeals of the Distnct of Columbia.
Copeland
Marshall, No. 77-1351 (D.C. Cir., orally argued Oct. 9, 1979). The dis
tnct court had reduced $206,000 request to $160,000 for 90 weeks of work m ob
tammg $33,000 m back pay and an affirmative action plan to elimmate Job discnml
nation. The ongmal appellate court rejected that award m favor of
pnnclple of
reImbursement to finn for its costs, plus reasonable and controllable margm for
profit" to be calculated from an exammation of the law firm finanCIal records.
Among the seven amICus cunae bnefs filed m the en banc reheanng, that of the
Equal Employment Opportunity CommISSIOn complamed that the new formula de
SIgned to reImburse lawyers at lower rates than the market value of theIr servIces,
will be an additional deterrent (to effective pnvate enforcement) and definitely un
dennme the congressIOnal mtent that fees be set at level to wean competent coun
sel from other types of law practice. Nat'l L.J., Oct. 1, 1979, at 3, col. 2. Those
groups that rely heavily on pro bono representation from large law finns complamed
that such cooperation will dwmdle "if the finns had to expose records of mcome,
overhead, and profits m order to Justify fee request. Id.
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brought by a class of franchIsees agamst theIr franchIsor. IS The
compromIse settlement encompasses a total reVisIon of the franchIse
agreement reflectmg major Improvements m the franchIsor s poli
CIes and practIces and a lump sum cash payment of $2.5 million. In
addition, the settlement Immeasurably Improves the franchIsees
workmg conditIOns m the crUCIal areas of territonal protectIon;
standards for termmatIon, renewal, expanSIOn, and transfer; elimI
natIon of overbeanng restnctIons; and, flexibility of marketmg prac
tIces. The value of these mtangibles was approxImately $12.5 mil
lion. Thus, the total settlement package amounted to $15 million.
After settlement, the attorney makes a fee request to the court
based upon the counsel's hours16 multIplied by the established
hourly rate. 17 ThIS "lodestar computatIon I8 IS multIplied by a mod
15. The same pnnclples would apply if we use an example of class of direct
purchasers bnngmg suit agamst honzontal combmation of pnce fixers.
In order to avoid unnecessary complications, assume that the same standards of
evaluation would be allowed for attorneys fees from the settlement fund as would
be charged agamst the VIOlators. In practice, there are some considerations requmng
disparate assessment m these categones. For example, the legal fee charges agamst
the unwilling VIOlator would be m the nature of penalty or deterrent agamst fu
ture VIOlations. It would further reward pnvate enforcement. In the allotment of fees
from
class settlement, the fees would be mvoluntarily paid by the absent class
members who were victims of the VIOlation. On the other hand, it would be patently
unfair for the absent class members to obtam wmdfall benefit without any nsk ex
posure either dunng the pendency of suit or at its conclUSIOn. In both cases, the JU
diCial calculation of attorneys fees should be substantially alike.
Franchisors have recogmzed the significance of JudiCial awarding of attorneys
fees and have mcorporated them, as functional element, mto theIr system. Some
franchisors have contractually specified that fees should be awarded for successful
legal defense. ThiS contract provIsion has been held VOId smce it would mevitably
chill the vigorous pnvate enforcement of the antitrust laws mandated by Congress.
Cohen
Commodore Plaza at Century 21 CondomInIUm Ass n, Inc., 368 So. 2d 613
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (encouragement of pnvate antitrust enforcement precludes
mdemnity for legal fees for successful defense).
Another such example has occurred m Massachusetts. In order to debilitate auto
mobile dealers from enforcmg theIr Massachusetts Bill of Rights the automobile fac
tones acceded to Widespread statutory amendments on condition that the legislature
elimmate both exemplary damages and attorneys fees. See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 93B, § 12 (West Cum. Supp. 1979). The auto dealers ultimately realized that the
clause was not deSigned to ennch counsel, but to facilitate the protection of theIr
nghts. TheIr effort to restore attorneys fees has been vigorously opposed. See H. R.
5244, Mass. Gen. Ct. (1979).
For diSCUSSIOn of the Massachusetts Bill of Rights see Brown, A Bill of Rights
fOT" Auto Dealers, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV 757 (1971).
16. Counsel hours are those reflected m the attorney daily diary and catego
nzed summary but not those hours spent m on-gomg speCialty research. See note 31
Infra.
17. The rate used IS based on the fee for legal services regularly performed by
counsel on fixed fee rate for clients who engage hiS services on noncontingent
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ifymg factor m order to cover the contmgent nature of the compen
satIon, the benefits conferred on the class, the complexity of the IS
sues, and the quality of the serVIces rendered. 19 In addition, a re
quest IS made for expenses mcurred after the settlement and the
tIme spent m processmg the fee application. The court has to de
termme whether the petitioned fees are reasonable and necessary
HistorIcally under the common fund doctrme, expenses and
fees were awarded for legal serVIces performed m the creation of a
fund m whICh the economIC benefits obtaIned by the plaIntiff were
to be shared by all members of the class. 20 Since the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure did not establish prOVISIons for an award of fees
In class actIons 21 the matter was governed entirely by general eqUI
table prInCIples. The fees were pnmarily awarded on the basIs of a
percentage of the recovery conSIstIng of the cash and the Interpo
lated value of the benefits conferred In kInd. 22 In the hypothetical,
the cash value recovered was $2.5 million with the Intangible ben
efits valued at $12.5 million. USIng a contIngent fee award23 of 20
percent, under earlier precedents, the fee award would be $3
million.
basIs and regularly pay his monthly mVOlces for services and expenses. See City of
N.Y.
Darling-Delaware, 440 F Supp. 1132, 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (rather than use
of hlstoncal rates after seven years of litigation, calculation at present rates IS appro
pnate to compensate for lost mterest and mflation").
18. The multiplication of hours times rates provides the basIs for economic cal
culation of attorneys fees. Lmdy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Amencan Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lmdy I).
19. ld. Courts have not always availed themselves of thiS method of computa
tion. As one author notes, "Many
courts Simply have awarded counsel flat per
centage of the recovery
Others have taken the size of the damage award mto
consideration. See Berger, supra note 5, at 287-88 (footnotes omitted).
20. The United States Supreme Court m Alyeska Pipeline Serv Co. v.
Wilderness Soc y 421 U.S. 240 (1975) held that the Amencan rule whereby each
party pay hiS own attorneys fees had several exceptions. Included m the exceptions
was the equity power of the courts to allow attorneys fees to be awarded under the
common fund doctnne. See also Serrano v. Pnest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141
Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977). In the current term, the Supreme Court will focus on whether
class action attorney awards may be obtamed not only from the money recovered by
class members, but also from the unclaimed portion of the Judgment fund. Boemg v.
Van Gernert, 590 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc), cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 2158
(1979) (No. 78-1327) (Van Gernert IV).
21. See note 4 supra.
22. For collection of such cases see Arenson
Board of Trade, 372 F Supp.
1349, 1357 n.14 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
23. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit was perhaps the ongmator
of the concept that contingent factor was mandatory m order to encourage pnvate
enforcement of legislation with
strong underlymg public policy Angoff
Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 189 (1st Cir. 1959).
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Led by the U S. Courts of Appeals for the Second24 and
ThIrd 25 Circuits, the calculatIon of fee awards has veered from such
a straIght contmgent fee mechamsm. EmphasIs IS bemg placed on
factors other than monetary results. A majority of the federal Cir
cuits have held that tIme expended should not be used as the sole
critenon upon whIch to base a fee award. 26
For a sunple fee award, the cIrcuits have relied upon the
twelve standards 27 codified m the Amencan Bar ASSOCIatIOn S Code
of ProfessIOnal Responsibility 28 Thus, courts should consIder the
followmg m theIr determmatIOn of fee awards:
(1) [T]he tIme and labor reqmred;
(2) the novelty and difficulty of the questIon presented;
(3) the skill reqmred to perform the legal serVIces;
(4) the preclUSIOn of other employment by the attorney due to
acceptance of the case;
(5) customary fee m the community'
(6) whether the fee IS fixed or contmgent;
(7) time limitatIons Imposed by client or cIrcumstances;
(8) the amount mvolved and the results obtamed;
(9) the expenence, reputatIon and ability of the attorney'
(10) the undesIrability of the case;
(ll) the nature and length of the profeSSIOnal relatIonshIp with
the client; [and]
(12) awards m SImilar cases. 29
24. City of Detroit Gnnnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974).
25. LIndy Bros. Builders, Inc.
Amencan Radiator & Standard Corp., 487 F.2d
161 (3d Cir. 1973) (LIndy I). Courts have not always availed themselves of this
method of computation. See note 19 supra.
26. Barber
Kimbrells, Inc., 577 F.2d 216 (4th Cir. 1978); King v. Greenblatt,
560 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1977), cen. dented, 438 U.S. 916 (1978); Finney v. Hutto, 548
F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1977), afl'd, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); GrunIn v. International House of
Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 127-28 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. dented, 423 U.S. 864 (1975);
Kerr
Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 70 (9th Cir. 1975), cen. dented, 425
U.S. 951 (1976); Johnson V. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th
Cir. 1974); Evans
Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177 187 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
In the First Circuit King
Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir. 1977), has been
expanded In Souza
Southworth, 564 F.2d 609, 611 (1st Cir. 1977), Reynolds
Coomey 567 F.2d 1166, 1167 (1st Cir. 1978), and Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80 (1st
Cir. 1979) (negation of plaIn percentage or straight hourly compensation m CIvil
nghts litigation).
27. Johnson
GeorgIa Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974)
(provIded the mitial case consideration for the twelve standards). See also Souza
Southworth, 564 F.2d 609 (1st Cir. 1977).
28. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DiSCIplinary Rule 2-106(b).
For its probable ongm, see In re Osofsky, 50 F.2d 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
29. Johnson
GeorgIa Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.
1974).
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Complex class actIon litIgatIon, however, reqUIres a refined
applicatIon of these standards. 30 InitIally the court should InqUIre
Into the hours expended on behalf of the class. 31 ThIS should be
done In a categonzed form shoWIng tIme allocatIon for such items
as court appearances, research, writIng, and discovery 32 It should
also Include classified IdentificatIon of the IndiVIduals who per
formed the work such as partners, aSSOCIates, law clerks, and para
legals. Hours whICh do not directly benefit the class should be con
SIdered separately 33 Based on its own knowledge, expenence, and
expertIse, the court should gIVe careful conSideratIon to whether
the hours clrumed and the tasks performed were reasonable In rela
tIon to the hme reqUIred by other attorneys to complete SImilar ac
tIvihes. 34
30. It IS realized that even m SImple case, the mterrelationshlp of the twelve
standards makes computation less than SImple activity
3l. In Keyes
School Distnct No.1, Denver, Colo., 439 F Supp. 393 (D.
Colo. 1977), school desegregation case, the fee requested for hours worked was re
duced by the court because of duplication, madequate itemIzation, non-legal work
and failure to prevail on all the Issues claImed. See also Parker
Mathews, 411 F
Supp. 1039 (D. D.C. 1976), afI'd sub nom. Parker Califano, 561 F.2d 320 (D.C. Cir.
1977); DaVIS v. Board of School Comm rs, 526 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1976).
Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denIed, 438 U.S.
32. In King
916 (1978), the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit stated that
detailed record of
the time spent on the case and the duties performed must be submitted; bills whICh
SImply list certam number of hours and lack
specifics as to dates and the nature
of work
should be refused. Id. at 1027
33. A pressmg Issue m thIS area IS whether to mclude the legal servIces assocI
ated with the application for the attorneys fee award. The CIrcuits are split on thIS
Issue. The First Circuit m Souza Southworth, 564 F.2d 609 (1st Cir. 1977), allowed
recovery for the time mvolved m secunng the fee award, but added that smce the
class was only mdirectly benefited, closer vIew will be taken of the reasonableness
of the expense. Id. at 614. Thus, while the "lodestar amount of fees may be m
creased by contingency factor, no multiplier should be used m fee awards litiga
tion. Lmdy Bros. Builders, Inc.
Amencan Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540
F.2d 102, 112 (3d Cir. 1976) (Lmdy II). See also Torres v. Sachs, 69 F.R.D. 343
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
A second alternative would be to compensate award litigation at lower rate.
Keyes
School Distnct No.1, Denver, Colo., 439 F Supp. 393, 410 (D. Colo. 1977).
The courts have also refused to award compensation for fee litigation. See Lmdy
Bros. Builders, Inc.
Amencan Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102,
111 (3d Cir. 1976) (Lmdy 11); Boe v. Colello, 447 F Supp. 607, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Latham
Chandler, 406 F Supp. 754, 757 n.2 (N.D. Miss. 1976); Clanton v. Allied
Chern. Corp., 416 F Supp. 39, 43 (E.D. Va. 1976).
In determmmg whether to make an award fee for fee litigation, courts should
recognIze that after the benefits of the class litigation have been assured, the class
may regard counsel as an adversary rather than an ally ThIS would be even though
the pro rata contribution of each class member to the legal fee may be modest. Thus,
there may be reluctance on the part of class members to be supportive of counsel'
claIm.
34. Unreasonable or unnecessary duplicative work effort or mefficlency should
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Mter the court has determmed the number of hours that were
of benefit to the class, it must then determme the basIc value of
the serVIces by fixmg a reasonable hourly rate. In so domg, it
should consIder the nature of the servIces performed, the complex
ity of the undertakmg, and the hourly fee charged for sImilar ser
VIces by attorneys with SImilar skills and qualificatIOns. Different
hourly rates should be assIgned to vanous categones of services. 35
By multIplymg the hourly rate by the hours, the court arnves at its
prelimmary gUIdepost, the "lodestar computation. 36
The fee award, however should consIder other vanables be
sIdes hours and rates m order to compensate the attorney accu
rately Therefore, the "lodestar" computatIOn must be adjusted to
account for the contingent nature of the undertakmg. 37 ThIS IS
done for several reasons. First, there IS no certamty that m a class
action suit the class will be certified or that certificatIOn will be
retamed. 38 Second, recovery IS uncertam, especIally if success de
pends on the advancement of umque concepts of law Thud, the
restructunng of an eXIstmg franchIse mvolves an mfinite senes of
vanables mcluding such diverse factors as marketmg forces, system
capacity monetary Issues, and a workable consensus of numerous
franchIsees and theIr adVIsors. Thus, where the court has de
termmed that more than the "lodestar IS warranted, the award
should be mcreased. ThIs IS done by applymg a weIghted multi
plier commensurate with the value whICh the court attributes to
the contmgency and the aforementioned qualitative factors. 39 The
result III the court' reducbon of the claimed hours. See In re Armored Car Antitrust
Litigation, 472 F Supp. 1357 1387-91 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (fee award of $262,000 In
$11.8 million compromise settlement, compared with total fee requests of $1,127,500,
pnmarily because of severe duplication, together with demal of multiplier be
cause of unexceptional quality of services and substantial reliance on pnor govern
ment cases against Violators).
35. The assignment of vanous rates to vanous categones may be of such com
plex nature that such an activity IS Impractical. ThiS IS especially true when the attor
ney rate IS general one In which the vanous categones of service have been in
cluded and an average hourly fee schedule computed. Hourly rates would then most
often be the amount an attorney would charge In noncontingent matter. See Lindy
Bros. Builders, Inc.
Amencan Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161,
167 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lmdy I).
36. [d. at 168.
37 Angoff Goldfine, 270 F.2d 185, 189 (1st Cir. 1959).
38. Class certification IS conditional and subject to later decertification. FED. R.
CIV P 23; In re Independent Gasoline Antitrust Litigation, [1979] 2 TRADE CAS.
(CCH) ~ 62,863, at 78,993 (D. Md. 1979).
39. ThiS multiplier IS nsk distribution bonus to the attorney It IS obVIOusly
subjective critena and therefore should be applied after the mitial determination of
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fees Incurred dunng the penod after the contIngency has been
elimInated by a final and bInding settlement should not be In
creased SInce the rIsk has been removed. 40
Perhaps the most complex task In the determInatIon of the fee
award IS to select the weIghted multIplier attributable to the con
tmgent nature of the undertakmg. In its determmatIon, the court
should consIder the probability of success at the tIme the suit was
filed. If'a case was preceded by a litIgated decree, perhaps only a
modest multIplier mIght be Justified. For example, a contested
governmental CIvil or cnmInal procedure may provIde pnma faCIe
proof of liability and, therefore, reduce the numencal value of the
multIplier.41 Because the U S. Department of JustIce has practI
cally abdicated its responsibility for franchIse litIgatIon,42 however,
such precedents have been rare In the franchIse area.
There are no definitIve gUIdelines for the establishment of the
multIplier factor When the tnal court finds that an Increased
award IS warranted, it should Identify the factors that warrant the
Increase, state the multIplier bemg used, and explicate its rea
sons. 43 In practIce, the mean weIghted multIplier used by the fed
eral courts IS three. In exceptIonal cases, a hIgher factor IS used.
While it IS rare to use a multIplier over three, it would usually be
mappropnate to use a factor less than twO. 44 A factor below two,
the "lodestar computation. ConSideration must be made, however, as to the
mterrelationshlp of the compensatory rate to the subjective critena. If hourly com
pensatory rates mclude the factors of nsk and case difficulty no multiplier should be
used. See King
Greenblatt, 560 F.2d 1024, 1027 (1st Cir. 1977); Grumn
Interna
tional House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 128 (8th Cir. 1975); City of Detroit
Gnnnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 471 (2d Cir. 1974).
40. See In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 416 F Supp. 907, 922 & n.43 (E.D.
Pa.1976).
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976). Under the Impact of collateral estoppel, there
should be cases mvolvmg reliance on contested FTC proceedings and most· espe
Cially on successful pnvate litigation against the same franchisor. See Parklane Ho
siery Co.
Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979); Perry
Amerada Hess Corp., 427 F Supp.
667 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
42. See U.S. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Amenca, No. C-79-2144 (N.D. Cal., filed
Aug. 15, 1979) (Civil antitrust tying claim to enJoin auto factory from conditioning the
grant of its franchise on the exclUSive purchase of replacement parts).
43. A court' failure to specify the rationale for an Increase has been found to
make such determmation unreViewable and therefore an abuse of discretion. Kerr
v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951
(1976); Lmdy Bros. Builders, Inc.
Amencan Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973) (Lmdy I).
44. The follOWing IS
tabulation of the hourly rates and the multipliers that
have been applied In number of fee awards under the antitrust laws and the secun
ties acts:
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however may be Justified when numerous attorneys particIpated,
when there was duplicatIOn of effort and unnecessary expenditure
CASE

NONCONTINGENT
HOURLY RATES
UPHELD

MULTIPLE OF HOURLY
RATE AWARDED

$75-$250/hr.

four times hourly rate Justified;
25% of $1 million fund 25% in
terest earned on settlement fund
until its distribution

Arenson v. Board of Trade, 372
F Supp. 1349 (N.D. Ill. 1974)
(antitrust).

$35-$125Ihr.

four times hourly rate up to
$500lhr., average of $359/hr.

In re Equity Funding Corp. of
Am. Sec. Litigation, 438 F Supp.
1303 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (secun
ties).

$60-$250/hr. partners +
$4O-$I00/hr. assocIates

Fned v. Utilities Leasing Corp.,
[1976-77 Transfer Binder) FED.
SEC. L. REp. (CCH) \I 95,696, at
90,429(E.D.Pa.1976)(securities).

In re Coordinated Pretnal Pro
ceedings In AntibIOtic Antitrust
Actions, 410 F Supp. 680 and
410 F Supp. 704 (D. Minn. 1975)
(antitrust).

Gilman v. Mohawk Data SCIen
ces, No. 71 CIV. 4742 (S.D.N.Y.
May 3, 1976) (securities).
In re Gypsum Cases, 386 F
Supp. 959 (N.D. Cal. 1974),
afi'd, 565 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir.
1977) (antitrust).

Miller v. Fisco, [1978] FED. SEC.
L. REp. (CCH) ~ 96,348, at 93,185
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (securities).

three times hourly rate to lead
counsel, two to co-counsel, one
and
half to assocIate counsel,
one to attorneys on SIdelines;
hlstonc hourly rates applied

$40-$200lhr.

three to one times hourly rate up
to $400lhr.

Up to $200/hr.

three times hourly rate, up to
$600lhr.

$30-$lOO/hr.
paralegal

$ 15/hr.

range of multiples up to three
times hourly rate; lead counsel
$300/hr.

$50-$250/hr.

three times hourly rate, up to
$750lhr., $300lhr. mIXed rate

Lindy Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Amer
ICan Radiator & Standard SanI
tary Corp., 382 F Supp. 999
(E.D. Pa. 1974), afi'd In part,
rev d In part, 540 F.2d 102 (3d
Cir. 1976) (en banc) (antitrust).

$35-$ 1251hr.

two times hourly rate affirmed In
award
from
recovenes
of
unrepresented claImants; when
award IS added to fees from rep
resented clients, effective multi
ple IS In excess of three for all at
torneys

In re Master Key Antitrust Litiga
tion, [1978]1 TRADE CAS. (CCH)
\I 61,887, at 73,715 (D. Conn.
1977) (antitrust).

$40-$1501hr.

two times hourly rate to lead
counsel, one and three quarters
to co-lead counsel

City of New York v. Darling
Delaware, 440 F Supp. 1132
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (antitrust).

$50-$1751hr.

Dorey Corp. v. E.!. duPont de
Nemours & Co., [1977] 1 TRADE
CAS. (CCH) \I 61,313, at 71,041
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (antitrust).

multiples up to two times hourly
rate; currently hourly rates
awarded across the board despite
lower rates In earlier seven year.;
of litigation

$35-$ 1501hr.

two times hourly rate
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of tIme, when the contmgency was mmImIzed by a pnor decree, or
when the recovery represented onIv a fractIon of the total probable
recovery m a clear vIOlatIon of the applicable law 45
The basIs of the discussIOn thus far has been the vanables util
Ized by the courts for the determmatIon of a fee award. Since the
end product IS a monetary value, it IS reasonable that a calculable
formula should be used. While the resultant monetary award will
be a specific mathematIcal figure, the formula s numencal values,
upon whICh the award IS predicated, are ImpreCIse. Many of the
values will be made by the subjectIve determmatIon of the court.
For mstance, there IS no mathematIcal formula whIch can be used
to determme the value of the multIplier That figure IS a result of a
court's subjectIve determmatIOn of vanables prevIOusly discussed.
In the franchIse hypothetIcal, the total settlement was $15 mil
lion: $12.5 million m mtangible results and $2.5 million m cash.
The court had before it a petitIon for attorneys fees. If only one at
torney was mvolved, the court could apply the followmg formula to
determme the fee award:
(H)(C)(M)

+ (H')(C')

=

FA

While complicated at first glance, the formula IS sImple m applica
tIon. The hours of the attorney (H) should be multIplied by the
compensatIon of the attorney (C) m order to achIeve the "lodestar
ThIs "lodestar would then be multIplied by the multIplier factor
(M). If post-settlement servIces were reqUIred, the formula would
be further developed. The same pnncIples would apply except that
CASE

Republic Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v.
Beasley, 73 F.R.D. 658 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (denvative securities).
In re Folding Carton Antitrust
Litigation, 937 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP (BNA) A-32
(N .0. Ill. 1979) (antitrust).
HEW Corp. v. Tandy Corp., No.
73-2654-F (D. Mass. Nov. 21,
1979) (antitrust).

NONCONTINGENT
HOURLY RATES
UPHELD

MULTIPLE OF HOURLY
RATE AWARDED

$80-$ 1501hr.

two times hourly rate

$50-$250/hr.

range of multiples, with three
times hourly rate for lead counsel

$30-$150/hr.

one and one quarter times hourly
rate for senior partner with
hourly rates
rangmg from
$75-$150 depending upon activ
ity; associate compensation from
$30-$75 depending upon activ
ity, no multiplier used

45. It IS clear that court would be dealing with fractional percentages if it
used multiplier below two SInce it would have to use multiplier calculation be
tween 1.1 and 1.9. A multiplier of one would not result In any additional compensa
tion.
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the admmlstratIve hours (H') and the admllllstratIve compensation
(C') of the attorney would be used. Presumably these would differ
from the rate charged m litigation. In additlOn, there would be no
multiplier smce the nsk factor would be removed after settlement.
The sum of the litigation and the admllllstratIve products would re
sult m the attorney s fee award (FA). 46 Assummg more than one
person worked on the case, a separate calculation for each would
be necessary The formula for the total fee award (TFA) would be:
TFA = FAp + FAA + FAs
ThIS would be the fee award for partners (FAp), plus the fee award
for assocIates (FAA)' plus the fee award for the law students or
paralegals (F As). Each of the separate fee awards would be calcu
lated m the same manner as m the prevlOUS example except no
multiplier (M) would be used for the student s fee. 47
Assume that m our hypothetical franchIse case three mdivldu
46. The formula used IS Simplification of more complex and accurate for
mula which could be used to calculate fee awards. The complex formula would con
sider vanous factors such as unnecessary hours expended on the case and unreason
able levels of computation. Thus, more accurate determination would be made by
uSing the following: [(H - UH)(C - UC)(M)] + (H' - UH')(C' - UC')] = FA. The
hours expended (H) would have to be reduced by the unnecessary hours expended
(UH). The unnecessary hours might Include those spent on travel, items unrelated to
the case or duplication of activity. See notes 31 & 32 supra. See also United Fed' of
Postal Clerks, AFL-CIO v. United States, 61 F.R.D. 13 (D. D.C. 1973). The same
principle would be applied to the unreasonable compensation (UC) whICh would be
subtracted from the compensation (C).
The multiplier (M) IS perhaps the most difficult and subjective of all factors to
determine. The courts have used vanety of multipliers. See note 44 supra. In order
to attract counsel willing to forego the normal compensation rate In lieu of an attor
ney fee award, courts have compensated for the contingency nsk by application of
multiplier, or, In some cases bonus. As Berger POints out:
If
there has been no Significant nsk
there should be no adjustment.
If the court concludes that success was more likely than not at the outset, an
Increase In the fee award of fifty percent would be appropnate. Where the
court concludes that the chance of success was about even at the outset, an
Increase In the hourly rate In the range of 100 percerit appears appropnate.
Finally, if the case appeared unlikely to succeed when Initiated, an Increase
of the baSIC hourly rate of up to 200 percent may be Justified to compensate
the attorney for the substantial nsk undertaken.
Berger, supra note 5, at 326.
The hours of post settlement administrative work (H') and the compensation for
that time (C') would, like the litigation work, be reduced by unnecessary hours of
administrative work expended (UH') and unreasonable compensation (UC'). Note
that there IS no multiplier Included In thiS calculation since there IS no contingent
nsk Involved.
47 It IS assumed that the overhead cost of secretanal and clencal assistance IS
subtotaled within the mdivldual hourly compensation rate charged by the firm.
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als worked on the case: a partner, an aSSOCiate, and a law student.
To ease the computatIon, further assume that each spent 500 hours
of nonduplicatIve tIme on the litIgatIon portIon of the case with the
partner spending 50 hours and the assocIate 100 hours In
non duplicatIve post settlement admimstratIve work. The hourly
non-contIngent compensatIon rates for a partner are assumed to be
$250 for litIgatIon and $200 for admInIstratIve work, for an assocIate
$150 and $100 respectively and for a law student a flat $5. For the
sake of the problem, these rates are assumed to be appropnate and
not mflated. 48 Based upon the difficulty of the case and the nsk In
volved, a multIplier of 3 will be used. The separate formula for
each of the IndivIduals will be:
TFA = FAp [(H)(C)(M) + (H')(C')] + FAA[(H)(C)(M) +
(H')(C')] + FAs [(H)(C)]49
InsertIng the numencal values Into the formula would result In a
fee award of $622,500. 50
While thIS IS consIderably less than the straIght contIngent fee
award of $3 million, it IS certaInly more reasonable. 51 ConsIder
however the effect of a change In the multIplier A multiplier of 4
would result III a fee recovery of $822,500, an Illcrease of
$200,000. 52 Thus, the courts should be cogmzant of the Impact a
change III the multiplier will make. An Illappropnate or poorly de
termIned multIplier could prove extremely costly to the losmg
party and be a wmdfall to the prevailing attorney
48. Our hypothetical law firm IS effiCient and honest.
49. The same formula IS necessary for each mdivldual as was pnnted m note 46
supra. The fonnula would be:
TFA = FAp [(H - UH)(C - UC)(M) + (H' - UH')(C' - UC')] + FAp [(H 
UH)(C - UC)(M) + (H' - UH')(C' - UC')] + FAs [(H - UH)(C 
UC) + (H' - UH')(C - UC')].
There IS no necessity to mclude multiplier with the law student' compensa
tion. While the salary of the student may not be subtotaled withIn the hourly com
pensation rate of the vanous partners and associates, as were the secretanal and cler
Ical salanes, there IS certaInly no nsk factor for the student.
50. Usmg the formula m note 49 supra, the calculations would be as follows:
FTA = FAp[(500 - 0)(250 - 0)(3) + (50 - 0)(200 - 0)] + FA A [(500 - 0)(150
- 0)(3) + (100 - 0)(100 - 0)] + FAsl(500 - 0)(5 - 0)] = FAp[(125,000)(3) +
10,000] + FA A [(75,000)(3) + 10,000] + FA s [2500] = FAp[375,000 + 10,000]
+ FA A [225,000 + 10,000] + FA s [2500] = FAp[385,000] + FA A [235,000] +
FA s [2500] = $622,500.
51. It should be noted that the statutes which allow for attorneys fees premise
that fee award as beIng reasonable. See note 5 supra. In addition, Sprogls
United Airlines, Inc., 517 F.2d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1975) has Implied that fees should
be proportionate to the damage recovered. While thiS IS title VII case, the same
principle should apply to franchise cases.
52. Calculation IS left to the reader.
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A generous award IS needed, however, to encourage pnvate
counsel to devote willingly the Immense amount of tIme and spe
cIalized effort reqUIred m complex litIgatIon. Successful prosecutIon
IS the basIc cornerstone of Congress statutory policy to encourage
pnvate enforcement of complex commercIal law Both Congress
and the courts have repeatedly recogmzed that public enforcement
of laws IS not adequate. Without the generous cooperatIon of the
pnvate attorney general, the strong public policy underlymg many
statutes could not be achIeved.
The overnding consIderatIon IS that the fee award be faIr to all
the persons mvolved mcluding the class members 53 and the law
yers. On the other hand, it also must be perceIved as faIr to an m
formed public lest it call mto questIon the mtegrity and reputatIOn
of the legal professIOn. 54 Although these goals may appear elUSIve,
the alternatIve should not be reliance solely upon mathematIcal cal
culatIons. It must evoke the careful applicatIon of common sense,
sound Judgment, and expenence:
[UltImately the] felt necessitIes of the tIme, the prevalent moral
and politIcal theones, mtentions of public policy avowed or un
conscIOUS, even the prejudices whICh Judges share with theIr
fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogIsm
m determmmg the rules by whICh men should be governed. The
law embodies the story of a nation s development through many
centunes, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contamed only the
axIOms and corollanes of a book of mathematics. 55

53. See Barron
Commercial & Indus. Bank, [1979] FED. SEC. L. REP (CCH)
97,132, at 92,240 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (legal fee In class action securities case settle
ment reduced from $325,000 to $275,000 because the class consisted mostly of re
tired and elderly persons).
54. Cf Blackle v. Borrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975) (class action brought
under the federal security laws claimIng misrepresentation about the company fi
nances).
55. O. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 1-2 (1881).
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